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Abstract: 
Given the global growth in ransomware attacks, employees need to understand the risks of ransomware and how to 
protect against it. This paper presents a teaching case based on an actual ransomware attack on a hospital that 
undergraduate or graduate course can use to teach students. The case introduces students to Wildcat Hospital, a 
fictitious 450-bed acute-care facility in a suburban location in the Northeastern United States. A ransomware attack hit 
Wildcat Hospital as the workday began. Malware infected the hospital's computers and demanded one bitcoin, a 
virtual currency that affords anonymity, as ransom to restore functionality of the information systems. The chief 
executive officer and the chief information officer led the organizational response to the attack. We include links to two 
videos, a demo of a Locky ransomware attack in action, and a National Broadcasting Company (NBC) TV network 
news report about a similar ransomware incident at another hospital (Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in 
California) to engage students. 
Keywords: Ransomware, Security Breach, Teaching Case Study. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Situation 
A ransomware attack has just occurred at a major private suburban hospital, Wildcat Hospital (WH). 
Ransomware is a form of malicious software (also known as malware) that infects a victim’s computer 
devices or files and prevents one from accessing them. The attacker demands a ransom from the victim 
and promises to restore access to the blocked devices or files upon payment. At WH, the malware denied 
access to critical information resources and demanded payment to restore availability. The attack 
occurred in the morning of a busy surgery schedule and continued as the day unfolded. After having 
completed her first surgery of the day, Dr. Sarah Sturgeon, a respected orthopedic surgeon, began 
preparations for her next scheduled surgery. Just before 8:30 a.m., she found that she could not access 
the patient records she needed to perform a scheduled complicated knee replacement surgery. Michael 
Raven, a new accounts payable (AP) clerk, had unwittingly unleashed the ransomware at the start of his 
workday, just after 8 a.m. Malware infected the hospital’s computers that demanded a ransom of one 
bitcoin, a virtual currency that affords anonymity, to restore functionality of the information systems. Ryan 
Wolfe, the hospital’s chief executive officer (CEO), and Jenna Fox, its chief information officer (CIO), led 
the organizational response to the ransomware attack. 
1.2 Background on Wildcat Hospital 
Wildcat Hospital (WH) was founded in 1922 when Will D. Cat left in trust the land and financial support to 
establish a community-based not-for-profit hospital. This hospital in Pennsylvania, located in the western 
suburbs of Philadelphia, is a 450-bed acute-care facility. The hospital provides a full range of healthcare 
services including cardiovascular care, imaging and diagnostic radiology, maternity services, orthopedic 
care, and rehabilitation care. This hospital is very important to the welfare of the local community. A 
dedicated team of healthcare professionals deliver exceptional medical care using advanced technology 
and cutting-edge research. Appendix A provides background information on WH’s information systems, 
business continuity plan, and information security policy. 
2 The Ransomware Attack 
In the early morning around 6 a.m., Dr. Sarah Sturgeon, a well-known orthopedic surgeon, arrived at the 
surgery center at WH. She had a full morning of surgeries scheduled that began at 7 a.m. Her first patient, 
Larry Longshot, a star basketball player, suffered an injury when he made a foul on a shot and landed 
awkwardly on the defender’s foot. In the process, he tore his anterior cruciate ligament (ACL). Prior to 
surgery, Dr. Sturgeon visited with Larry to discuss the surgery with him. After the discussion, Dr. Sturgeon 
jokingly said, “Do I get good tickets?”. Larry replied, “The best, center court!”. 
After Larry’s successful surgery, Dr. Sturgeon dictated her notes for Larry’s medical records. She then 
checked on Larry before preparing for her next scheduled surgery, a complicated full knee replacement. 
Just before 8:30 a.m. as the next patient was being prepped, Dr. Sturgeon walked over to the computer 
workstation to access the patient’s medical records, including magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), but 
found that she could not access the records. After repeated attempts, a frustrated and concerned Dr. 
Sturgeon called out to a colleague for assistance. To her surprise and extreme concern, Dr. Sturgeon 
learned that all of the surgical staff members were experiencing a similar situation. They contacted the 
help desk, which responded that staff members throughout the hospital were also contacting the help 
desk with questions about how to access hospital information systems after they had been locked out. 
Earlier at 8:00 a.m., Michael Raven, an AP clerk on the job for one month, arrived at work. He sat down at 
his desk to check his emails. He opened an email with an invoice attached and opened the attachment. 
Not recognizing the payee, he became suspicious about the authenticity of the invoice. He decided to 
withhold payment until further investigation that involved matching the invoice with a purchase order and 
the receipt of goods. First, he went for coffee before settling in to determine if the invoice presented a 
legitimate request from a supplier of medical diagnostics equipment. When returning to his desk, he 
looked at his computer screen and saw a demand for ransom (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Screenshot Depicting the Ransom Demand at Wildcat Hospital (Palo Alto Networks, 2016) 
Frantically, he called the help desk to inform them. He worriedly stated: “My computer is locked! I can’t get 
it to do anything. It says all my files are encrypted and I have to pay one bitcoin to get a decryption pack!”. 
Emily Sable, a help desk technician who had answered the phone, recognized the gravity of the situation 
and responded: “Please hold. I’m transferring your call to the Help Desk Manager, Daniel Lynx.”. After 
repeating the same information, Lynx told Raven: “It sounds like we’ve been hit by a ransomware attack! 
We’re beginning an investigation immediately. Stay at your desk and don’t touch the computer. We’re 
sending a team there right away to assess the situation.”. Raven had not yet realized that, by opening the 
email and the invoice attached to that email, he became an unwitting accomplice to a ransomware attack 
on his employer. He replied: “What’s a ransomware attack? Why did this attack occur at Wildcat 
Hospital?”. Lynx transferred the call back to Sable, who responded to Raven’s questions. 
2.1 What is Ransomware? 
Ransomware is a type of malware that takes control of computer systems by encrypting or locking files or 
data on devices (such as computers, mobile phones, or wearable devices) to render them unavailable and 
hold them hostage until the target pays a ransom. While motives for these attacks may differ, the have the 
same impact: they disable or destroy computer files and, thus, take services offline. Upon payment, the 
attackers promise to restore the compromised computer(s). In most cases, the attackers intend to cause 
disruption and alarm to prompt victims into paying the ransom rather than to post or sell data to 
cybercriminals. According to Ed Amoroso, former chief security officer at AT&T, “[Cyber risk is] never 
going to go away, and people are going to have to keep worrying about it. Just like bank robbery, you 
can’t say get rid of (cyber risk) and make it never happen.” (Norton, 2017). 
Two main types of ransomware exist (see Figure 2) (Deloitte, 2016). The first, locker, locks a computer or 
device. The second, crypto, prevents access to files or data, usually through encryption. As we discuss 
below, ransomware occurs in several different forms, and attackers constantly create new variants to 
bypass antivirus software and intrusion-detection systems, which makes pre-attack detection difficult.  
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Figure 2. Two Main Types of Ransomware 
2.1.1 Locker Ransomware 
Locker ransomware locks the victim out of the operating system, which denies them access to the 
computer and any applications (apps) or files. Typically, locker ransomware locks a device’s user interface 
but does not encrypt the files. The attackers demand a fee to restore access to the infected device by 
displaying an alarming message intended to scare the victim into paying the demanded amount. The 
message may state, for example, that law enforcement has detected criminal activity for which the victim 
must pay a fine or face criminal charges (see Figure 3). The attackers restore access to the computer 
upon payment.  
 
Figure 3. Screenshot Depicting an Example of Law Enforcement-themed Ransomware (Motormille2, 2016) 
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Victims usually use a payment voucher to pay the ransom because they cannot use their locked devices. 
Alternatively, the locked computer may be left with limited capabilities. For example, the mouse might not 
work and only the numeric keys on a keyboard might work (to allow the victim to type the numbers for the 
payment code). Locker ransomware is less effective than crypto ransomware because it may not be 
difficult for a knowledgeable person to restore access to the device.  
2.1.2 Crypto Ransomware 
Crypto ransomware incorporates advanced encryption algorithms to render files and systems 
inaccessible. This ransomware can employ various cryptographic techniques to encrypt files, scramble file 
names, or add different extensions to files. Typically, it displays an extortion message that promises to 
provide a decryption key to unencrypt the files upon ransom payment. Crypto is the more common and 
effective type of ransomware because victims cannot access their encrypted files regardless of the device 
they use and because they can pay the ransom with relatively anonymous bitcoins.  
Crypto ransomware occurs in several different forms, referred to as families, which makes pre-attack 
detection difficult. A family of Crypto ransomware called Locky, released in 2016, is one of the most 
common ransomware families. Other examples include CryptoLocker, CrytpoWall, WannaCry, Petya, 
among others. Figure 4 provides an example of Petya.  
Video 1:  One can find a video that overviews what a Locky ransomware attack looks like at 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/3147946/security/video-infecting-a-system-with-locky-
ransomware.html 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot Depicting an Example of Petya Ransomware Blocking Microsoft Windows Startup 
(Anonymous, 2017) 
2.2 Who are the Targets of Ransomware? 
According to cybersecurity solution provider Symantec (2017), the top 10 regions most affected by 
ransomware during the first half of 2017 remained unchanged from 2016 (see Figure 5). The United 
States had the largest share of detections in 2017 at 29 percent, a decrease from 34 percent in 2016. Italy 
experienced a one percent increase, from seven percent in 2016 to eight percent in 2017, while the other 
countries experienced an increase from 27 percent in 2016 to 31 percent in 2017. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Ransomware Detections Worldwide from January to June, 2017, by Country 
While any organization that relies on ready access to essential data to function is a primary target, 
healthcare facilities in particular attract hackers (Larson, 2017). In addition to healthcare providers, home 
computers, businesses, utilities, government agencies, academic institutions, and even law-enforcement 
agencies worldwide have all been ransomware victims. No industry, government, organization, or 
individual is immune from attack. For example, WannaCry, the biggest cyberattack to date, infected more 
than 300,000 devices in 150 countries. Chile-based LATAM Airlines, universities in China, German railway 
company Deutsche Bahn, Spanish phone provider Telefónica, the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) National 
Health Service (NHS), and the U.S. delivery service FedEx were all victims. Attackers have also targeted 
media companies with threats to prerelease a movie or television show unless they pay a ransom. For 
example, attackers made demands against the Walt Disney Company that they would prerelease “Pirates 
of the Caribbean” and against Netflix that they would release new “Orange is the New Black” episodes 
unless these companies paid a ransom. 
According to Symantec (2017), the average ransom demand increased more than threefold from US$294 
to US$1,077 per device between 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 6). The average ransom demanded 
decreased from US$1,077 in 2016 to US$544 in the first six months of 2017, but the latter figure still 
represents an increase of 85 percent from 2015. Symantec attributes the decrease to attackers’ finding 
the “sweet spot” for ransom demands. Graham (2017) reports that Kaspersky Lab has estimated the total 
cost to an organization for a ransomware incident to reach around US$713,000 on average, which 
includes the ransom amount paid and related losses, such as the value of data lost and expenses to 
improve infrastructure and restore lost brand equity. 
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Figure 6. Estimated Average Ransom Amount per Device Demanded by Ransomware Attackers Worldwide 
from 2014 to the First Half of 2017 (in U.S. Dollars) 
Although ransomware initially targeted Windows platforms, they now target Apple and Android systems as 
well. Ransomware attacks cell phones and wearable devices by changing the personal identification 
number (PIN) number and demanding a ransom in exchange for a new PIN. Additionally, a U.S.-based 
survey (Arctic Wolf Networks, 2017) found that 13 percent of all ransomware attacks on small to mid-sized 
businesses targeted Internet of things (IoT) devices. 
3 Back at Wildcat Hospital the Response Begins  
Directly after speaking with Raven, Lynx called Fox to inform her that her worst nightmare had come to 
pass. Based on the ransom demand on Raven’s screen, coupled with numerous requests that 
overwhelmed the help desk for assistance in gaining access to critical files, Lynx told her: “We’ve been hit 
with a ransomware attack”. He added: 
From my quick assessment of incoming calls, I believe that the integrated hospital information 
system, which manages all of the Hospital's operations, including medical, administrative, 
financial, and legal functions, as well as the processing of health services, is inaccessible. When 
employees tried to access their computers, they were presented with a demand for ransom. We 
believe this attack began when Raven clicked on an email attachment. In response, this new 
employee said, and I quote Raven, “Nevermore will I click on an attachment in an unexpected 
suspicious-looking email”.  
Recognizing the dire situation and that time was of the essence, Fox immediately reported the incident to 
Wolfe, who had recently been overwhelmed by fundraising for a new wing for the hospital. She then 
began to head up an incident response by consulting a responsibility assignment matrix, such as a 
responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed (RACI) matrix1. Figure 7 shows a draft of the RACI 
matrix. Responsible refers to the person, role, or team responsible for actually performing an assigned 
task. Accountable refers to the person or team ultimately accountable for the task. The accountable 
person or team must sign off on the task’s completion to indicate their approval. Consulted refers to those 
people (typically subject matter experts) whose input responsible and accountable use prior to a final 
decision or completion of a task. Consulted provides and, in response, receives required information 
to/from responsible and accountable. Thus, communication with this group is two way in nature. Informed 
refers to those people (e.g., system users) who need to be informed after a decision or action is taken. 
Thus, communication from responsible, accountable, and consulted to this group is one way in nature.  
                                                     
1 The RACI matrix is one of many variations of the responsibility assignment matrix. Webster (1999) reports the concept of the matrix 
approach originated in Cleland and Munsey’s (1967) proposal of “how to use a linear responsibility chart to assign authority and 
responsibility in the matrix organization” (p. 62).  
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The hospital used the RACI matrix for various incident types and, therefore, completed a draft RACI to 
respond to this ransomware attack. The matrix lists the tasks along the vertical axis. It lists the roles along 
the horizontal axis. At each intersection of the row and column, one enters the key responsibility (or 
responsibilities) (i.e., responsible, accountable, consulted, and/or informed) into the cell. 
 
Figure 7. RACI Matrix for Wildcat Hospital 
Next, Fox activated both the incident management team and the incident response team. The two teams 
began working together to investigate the cause and extent of the hospital information system (HIS) 
system shutdown. The incident management team comprised management personnel in non-technical 
areas such as human resources, audit and risk management, legal, compliance, and public relations. The 
incident response team comprised information technology (IT) experts who investigated attacks by 
gathering and analyzing relevant information from affected devices, systems, and networks. The two 
teams communicated among themselves and each other about the status of the incident response and 
coordination of responsibilities in order to formulate how the hospital would respond. The teams also had 
to work together to minimize negative impacts from the incident, investigate the cause of the attack, 
restore normal operations as quickly as possible, and recommend new security initiatives to prevent 
similar incidents in the future.  
4 Fox Recalls a Similar Ransomware Attack 
As the incident response got underway, Fox recalled viewing a National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 
news report about a similar ransomware incident at another hospital, Hollywood Presbyterian Medical 
Center (HPMC) in California (Wagstaff, 2016). HPMC had paid a ransom of 40 bitcoins, the equivalent of 
about US$17,000 at the time (bitcoin’s price experiences much volatility; see Bitcoin, n.d.), to regain 
access to their computer systems. Fox thought to herself: “HPMC’s situation likely differs from ours”. 
Nonetheless, she called Allen Stefanek, the hospital’s president and CEO, to inquire about its experience 
with that ransomware attack to provide a point of reference to help WH in evaluating its own predicament.  
4.1 A Synopsis of the Ransomware Attack at Hollywood Presbyterian Medical 
Center 
HPMC is a private short-term acute care hospital with 434 beds located in Los Angeles, California. In the 
evening on 5 February, 2016, HPMC employees began reporting to their supervisors that they could not 
access the hospital’s computer network. The IT department began an immediate investigation. The local 
NBC4 Los Angeles news affiliate first reported the incident on 12 February, 2016.  
Video 2:  To view NBC4 report, visit http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/FBI-LAPD-
Investigating-Hollywood-Hospital-Cyber-Attack-368703121.html 
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News Anchor/Reporter Robert Kovacik broadcast a statement by HPMC President and CEO Allen 
Stefanek that revealed that: “Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center is the victim of a cyberattack”. A staff 
physician recounted: “I was told that the hospital’s entire computer system was hacked, shutdown, and 
was being held for ransom”. He further added: “I was told that the hackers demanded 9,000 bitcoin 
(approximately US$3.4 million) be electronically sent to them, and in exchange, the hackers would send 
back the key codes, to restore the system.” 
4.1.1 The Situation at Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center during the Cyberattack 
Stefanek immediately acknowledged “significant IT issues and declared an internal emergency”. The 
hospital took the electronic medical records (EMR) system and other computer systems offline. The 
hospital notified the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Los Angeles Police Department 
Cyber Crimes Unit, which began investigating the source of the attack. The FBI recommended that HPMC 
not pay the ransom. However, this option may not be viable if victims cannot access their critical systems 
and files. The hospital hired computer forensics experts.  
The cyberattack interfered with the hospital’s day-to-day operations. Staff had to perform tasks on paper 
that they usually used a computer for, such as patient registration and medical records modification. With 
no email, staff relied on fax machines, telephones, and written notes to communicate. Andrew Mundell, a 
security architect at security company Sophos based in the United Kingdom, said: “Ambulances were 
diverted, electronic medical records disappeared, email was unavailable, and the hospital had no access 
to X-rays or CT scan information”. Computers, needed to complete lab work, pharmacy functions, and 
electronic communications, were offline. 
Stefanek asserted that “Patient care [was] not compromised in any way”. However, NBC reported that 
“911 patients to the emergency room [were] diverted to other hospitals”. Patients who needed medical 
tests unavailable at HPMC without a functioning network drove to more remote hospitals. Patients had to 
pick up the results of medical tests in person because they could not receive them electronically. A staff 
physician commented: “The computers are essential for documentation of patient care…[but] previous 
medical records…are inaccessible. Very dangerous.”. 
In addition to assuring that the attack had not comprised “the delivery and quality of…excellent patient 
care”, Stefanek indicated that it had not compromised privacy in any way. He stated: “At this time we have 
no evidence that any patient or employee information was subject to unauthorized access or extraction by 
the attacker”.  
4.1.2 Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center Pays the Ransom 
In a letter the hospital released 10 days after the incident began (see Appendix B), Stefanik announced 
that: “HPMC has restored its EMR on Monday, 15 February. All clinical operations are utilizing the EMR 
system. All systems currently in use were cleared of the malware and thoroughly tested.”. HPMC paid 40 
bitcoins (approximately US$17,000) for the ransomware crypto key. In this letter, Stefanik affirmed that: 
“The reports of the hospital paying 9,000 Bitcoins or US$3.4 million are false.”. An initial news report by 
local NBC4 Los Angeles News affiliate in Video 2 stated the ransom requested was 9,000 Bitcoins. 
In making the decision to pay the ransom, HPMC CEO Stefanik reasoned that: "The quickest and most 
efficient way to restore our systems and administrative functions was to pay the ransom and obtain the 
decryption key. In the best interest of restoring normal operations, we did this.”.  
5 Should Wildcat Hospital Pay the Ransom? 
After her phone call to Stefanik, Fox reflected on the ransomware incident. She wondered: 
Should we take a copycat approach and simply pay the ransom as HPMC did? No, we can’t 
make such an important decision without weighing the relevant factors at WH. The reality is that 
the decision to pay or not pay the ransom cannot easily be known up front. So, what factors 
weigh into the decision to pay or not? 
She began to think about the need to determine the type of ransomware WH confronted. Many questions 
began to enter her mind. What was the scale of the attack and how widespread was the encryption? Was 
the entire HIS actually encrypted? She wondered if the incident response team could take down all 
system interfaces on the computer network to prevent the malware from spreading further. The hospital 
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needed to roll out the business continuity plan. Could the hospital sustain business operations without 
access to EHR? If so, for how long? How well formulated was the business continuity plan to recover from 
a ransomware attack? Exactly when did the last data backup occur? Should the hospital contact 
consultants to provide assistance? She thought to herself: “Am I overlooking any important factors as I 
begin to prepare for the decision by formulating different possible scenarios based upon the findings of 
our incident response team, incident management team, and others? What are our response options?”. 
6 Protecting Wildcat Hospital against Future Ransomware Attacks 
Fox was determined that WH would never again be a victim of ransomware. As she considered the 
different possible scenarios and next steps, she also began to determine how the hospital could protect 
itself in the future. She recognized the need to update both the hospital’s information security policy (ISP) 
and the business continuity plan. How could the hospital improve employees’ awareness and compliance 
with the revised ISP? In addition, what IT measures should the hospital implement to defend against 
ransomware and other information security threats? 
7 Questions 
1) What is phishing, spearphishing, malware, and ransomware? How are they related? What role 
did these play in the ransomware attack at Wildcat Hospital? 
2) Do you recommend that Wildcat Hospital pay the ransom? Why or why not? What factors 
should the hospital consider in making the decision to pay or not pay the ransom? 
3) What are the risks that Wildcat Hospital faces if it does and if it does not pay the ransom? 
4) What ethical considerations does Wildcat Hospital face if they do pay the ransom and if they 
do not pay? 
5) Are the three sections of the information security policy, as currently written, sufficient 
measures to protect against ransomware? What, if any, changes do you recommend? Is CIO 
Jenna Fox shortsighted in focusing on employees?  
6) What are the best ways for an organization to protect themselves against a ransomware 
attack?   
7) Please answer the following questions regarding Wildcat Hospital’s incident response: 
a) Who would be on the incident management team (management personnel)? What 
would be their roles and responsibilities? 
b) Who would be on the incident response team (technical personnel)? Define their roles 
and responsibilities. 
c) Identify any consultants whom the hospital could hire as part of the response effort (i.e., 
public relations, legal counsel, technical support) and indicate what their responsibilities 
would be. 
Note: more information must be acquired from Wildcat Hospital. What questions would you ask? One 
needs to conduct more research regarding ransomware to adequately respond to each of the questions. 
Please state any assumptions that you make. 
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Appendix A: Wildcat Hospital’s IT Infrastructure and Key Policies 
In this appendix, we provide background information on WH’s IT infrastructure and key policies to provide 
context for the environment in which the ransomware attack occurred. In Section A1, we describe WH’s 
information systems and depict WH’s integrated HIS (see Figure 8). In Section A2, we discuss the 
business continuity plan and present the objectives of the plan. In Section A3, we present sections of the 
information security policy that apply to a ransomware attack.  
A1 Wildcat Hospital’s Information Systems  
Multiple departments such as surgery, hospitalization, ambulatory, and emergency medicine use core 
services of the hospital such as laboratories, operating rooms, physical therapy services, and food 
services. All of these departments rely on WH’s integrated HIS, which Figure A1 shows. Dozens of the 
hospital’s systems were built over 20 years ago, including clinical systems, supply chain, and billing and 
represent a mix of packaged systems and systems developed in house. At that time, security did not 
represent a primary consideration in the systems development lifecycle (SDLC). Jack Coyote, the 
hospital’s systems development manager, noted, “It isn’t practical to rewrite all existing applications with a 
secure development mindset. Legacy software has vulnerabilities, but no company can shoulder the cost 
of rewriting all of their applications.”. 
A1.1 The Data Center 
Multiple applications ran inside a single onsite data center located in a room with six racks of servers with 
each application hosted on its own set of virtual servers. The data center spread requests among a pool of 
front-end servers that processed them. These requests originated from a diverse collection of desktops, 
laptops, thin-client terminals, and many medical devices connected to the local area network, such as 
mobile x-ray machines, electrocardiogram (EKG) carts, and handheld devices. More than 2,200 
employees, including 500 physicians, used about 3,500 endpoints in total. 
A1.2 The Local Area Network 
Many employees relied on the network to access critical healthcare applications, such as the fully 
integrated electronic health record (EHR) system, to share data and streamline processes across the 
organization. The hospital had steadily expanded the network to keep pace with its growth and growing 
needs. Images, such as x-rays, and other vital medical information, which ranged from 10MB to 5GB in 
file size, were sent over the network. The applications, along with VoIP, had high priority on the network. 
IT had periodically received complaints about poor performance on its network connections that slowed 
down the business applications. The hospital could not tolerate congested connections and slow 
application performance. Matthew Mink, the hospital’s network manager, said: “Doctors need images to 
be available on demand and do not have excess time to wait for downloads to complete”. 
A1.3 Information Systems Security 
To safeguard the hospital’s assets, WH used a wide assortment of separate security systems (e.g., 
traditional firewalls, anti-virus software, and Web filtering software) from multiple vendors. Mink 
commented: “We need to be sure that all of our data and systems are secure”. In a further effort to defend 
against cyberattacks, the hospital blocked Internet traffic originating from countries notorious for a high 
volume of attacks, such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia. Mink observed: “This approach is practical 
because our patients are local”. 
Mink undertook risk-management assessments across the hospital’s IT environment when he found the 
time. He noted: “We assess potential vulnerabilities from a wide range of threats and use the findings to 
create appropriate mitigation strategies”. In these assessments, he reported that security tools sometimes 
sent alerts of an attack when switched on. Such false alerts took resources to address. Thus, the hospital 
had a need to minimize false positives to focus on real threats. Mink observed: “We don’t have a chief 
information security officer or a large security team. With the escalating occurrences and sophistication of 
cyberattacks, it’s clear that we need additional capabilities.”. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 610  
 
Volume 43  10.17705/1CAIS.04332 Paper 32  
 
A1.4 The Need to Update the IT Infrastructure 
Evolving technology innovations that required increased connectivity, such as wireless devices and mobile 
health applications, prompted WH to consider updating their IT infrastructure for both new and existing 
facilities to increase efficiency and reduce costs. For example, bandwidth had to simultaneously support 
the use of hospital management functions, email, Web browsing, EHR, real-time image transfer, and 
video consultations. Servers could be standardized with one or two types of server hardware for the 
advantages of technical familiarity, managing patches and upgrades more easily, and keeping 
management overhead to a minimum. 
 
Figure A2. Wildcat Hospital’s Integrated Hospital Information System 
With the accelerating pace of IT innovation in recent years, WH had simply added new capabilities without 
fully considering underlying risks. To avoid considering security as an afterthought, Fox was determined to 
change the current “culture of technology innovation that refuses to ‘bake in’ security from day one” 
(Loten, 2018). 
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A2 Business Continuity Plan at Wildcat Hospital  
WH had a business continuity plan in place to safeguard systems and mission-critical infrastructure in the 
event of a disruption from both natural and manmade disasters. The development of this plan predated 
the rise of ransomware and, thus, did not specifically address ransomware attacks. The objectives of 
WH’s business continuity plan included:  
1) Rapid recovery and timely resumption of critical operations in a way that focused on patients 
first. 
2) Rapid recovery and timely resumption of workforce productivity with support for 
communication and collaboration. 
3) Regular backup of data and systems. 
4) Geographical dispersion of IT resources to an offsite facility to meet recovery and resumption 
activities. 
5) Regular comprehensive review and testing of critical internal and external recovery 
arrangements. 
WH contracted with a private cloud service to provide data and application back-up and disaster recovery. 
The cloud-based backup was isolated from the live source.  
WH struggled to keep pace with demand for storage and computing capacity from the expanded use of 
their EHR system, advanced imaging systems, and other new technologies. As a result, Fox realistically 
recognized: 
There’s no guarantee that all of the data will get backed up every single day. Some 
organizations back up data daily. But for an entire health system, even daily backups can be hit 
or miss in terms of what kind of data is included, be that laboratory test results, radiology 
images, personal data like blood pressure and weight, medical history, or other types. 
WH had considered contracting with a cloud managed services provider (MSP). A cloud MSP can provide 
guidance and support for disaster recovery planning to rapidly restore data and applications. MSPs also 
offer secure data encryption, anti-virus protection, network monitoring, multi-factor authentication, 
intrusion detection, patching and updates to hardware and operating systems, and other services. WH 
concluded their in-house approach to public cloud management to be a better approach based solely on 
cost. 
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A3 Wildcat Hospital’s Information Security Policy 
Fox recognized that human behavior is often the weakest link in cybersecurity. She hoped that users of 
the hospital’s information systems followed the information security policy (ISP). The hospital adapted the 
ISP it used from a template that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2018) provided. 
Table 1 presents sections of this policy that pertain to a ransomware attack. 
Table A1. Wildcat Hospital’s Information Security Policy (Adapted from U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2018) 
Reporting software malfunctions 
Users should inform the appropriate personnel when the user’s software does not appear to be functioning correctly. 
The malfunction—whether accidental or deliberate—may pose an information security risk. If the user, or the user's 
manager or supervisor, suspects a computer virus infection, these steps should be taken immediately: 
Stop using the computer 
Do not carry out any commands, including commands to <Save> data.  
Do not close any of the computer's windows or programs.  
Do not turn off the computer or peripheral devices.  
If possible, physically disconnect the computer from networks to which it is attached.  
Inform the appropriate personnel as soon as possible. Write down any unusual behavior of the computer (screen 
messages, unexpected disk access, unusual responses to commands) and the time when they were first noticed.  
Write down any changes in hardware, software, or software use that preceded the malfunction.  
Do not attempt to remove a suspected virus! 
Internet access 
Internet access is provided for users and is considered a great resource for the organization. This resource is costly to 
operate and maintain, and must be allocated primarily to those with business, administrative or contract needs. 
Users must understand that individual Internet usage is monitored, and if an employee is found to be spending an 
excessive amount of time or consuming large amounts of bandwidth for personal use, disciplinary action will be taken.  
Many Internet sites, such as games, peer-to-peer file sharing applications, chat rooms, and on-line music sharing 
applications, have already been blocked by routers and firewalls. This list is constantly monitored and updated as 
necessary.  Any employee visiting pornographic sites will be disciplined and may be terminated. 
Spam email (also known as junk email) 
All communications using IT resources shall be purposeful and appropriate.  Distributing “junk” mail, such as chain 
letters, advertisements, or unauthorized solicitations is prohibited.  A chain letter is defined as a letter sent to several 
persons with a request that each send copies of the letter to an equal number of persons.  Advertisements offer 
services from someone else to you. Solicitations are when someone asks you for something.  If you receive any of the 
above, delete the email message immediately. Do not forward the email message to anyone. 
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Appendix B: Letter Released by Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center 
(Powderly, 2016) 
 
 
 
February 17, 2016 
I am writing to talk to you about the recent cyber incident which temporarily affected the operation of our 
enterprise-wide hospital information system. 
It is important to note that this incident did not affect the delivery and quality of the excellent patient care 
you expect and receive from Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center (“HPMC”). Patient care has not been 
compromised in any way. Further, we have no evidence at this time that any patient or employee 
information was subject to unauthorized access. 
On the evening of February 5th, our staff noticed issues accessing the hospital’s computer network. Our 
IT department began an immediate investigation and determined we had been subject to a malware 
attack. The malware locked access to certain computer systems and prevented us from sharing 
communications electronically. Law enforcement was immediately notified. Computer experts immediately 
began assisting us in determining the outside source of the issue and bringing our systems back online. 
The reports of the hospital paying 9,000 Bitcoins or $3.4 million are false. The amount of ransom 
requested was 40 Bitcoins, equivalent to approximately $17,000. The malware locks systems by 
encrypting files and demanding ransom to obtain the decryption key. The quickest and most efficient way 
to restore our systems and administrative functions was to pay the ransom and obtain the decryption key.  
In the best interest of restoring normal operations, we did this. 
HPMC has restored its electronic medical record system (“EMR”) on Monday, February 15th. All clinical 
operations are utilizing the EMR system. All systems currently in use were cleared of the malware and 
thoroughly tested. We continue to work with our team of experts to understand more about this event. 
I am very proud of the dedication and hard work of our staff who have maintained the highest level of 
service, compassion and quality of care to our patients throughout this process. I am also thankful for the 
efforts of the technical staff as the EMR systems were restored, and their continued efforts as other 
systems are brought back online. 
And of course, I want to thank our patients and community for their continued trust in Hollywood 
Presbyterian Medical Center. 
Thank you, 
 
Allen Stefanek, President & CEO Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center 
1300 N VERMONT AVE. 
LOS ANGELES, CA 90027 
(213) 413-3000 
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